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y first introduction to Joan Cadden’s award-winning
monograph came during a graduate course at UC Davis on
medieval science and medicine. As the only student in the
class, Joan suggested I draft a reading list to which she would add relevant or useful texts. At the top of the list I had placed Meanings of Sex
Difference in the Middle Ages. Joan looked over my reading list and said
to me, “you don’t need to read this[her book], there are more important
works for you to read.” Somewhat perplexed, I dutifully modified my
reading list, removing Joan’s monograph.
Now, as an early modern Spanish historian, I’m a bit of an outsider in
this crowd. I do not specialize in women’s history, gender history, or the
history of sexuality; nor do I work on later medieval natural philosophical
and medical treatises—all areas where Joan’s work (as you will certainly
hear from others) has been instrumental in shaping scholars’ notions
and approaches. My research focuses on political and institutional histories of the Spanish state as they intersect with the intellectual history
of medicine, particularly in sixteenth-century Spain. Yet, Joan’s work
(which I did manage to read) has much to offer scholars of my stripe.
No one who reads Meanings of Sex Difference can deny the complexity
of the story Joan crafts for her readers. This text does not provide the
reader with a linear and progressive narrative of medieval thought on
notions of sex difference. To do so would silence the cacophony of voices
Joan brings to the reader’s ear and the sometimes shared and sometimes
competing interests those voices represent. This is not to say that her
work leaves the reader with nothing but a crescendo of noise as one voice
shouted above others or as others fell silent over time. What Joan’s work
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suggests to me is that there is something inherently important in our
choices to hear or silence those voices and our willingness to allow for
dissonance even when we prefer harmony.
More recently her scholarship has led me to rethink the current state
of the history of science and medicine in early modern Spain which has
left scholars struggling to write the history of Spain into a grand narrative of the Scientific Revolution. At a recent conference, my co-panelists
and I discussed the direction our work in the history of medicine was
taking, and all three of us felt compelled to write our stories within
the context of the Scientific Revolution. But in order to put sixteenthcentury Spain on the historical map, we seem trapped in expressing the
relationship among practitioners and their medical knowledge in a series
of dichotomous relationships within a framework of progress, literate
vs. illiterate practitioners, elite vs. empirical practitioners, theoretical
vs. experiential practitioners, court vs. itinerant practitioners, male vs.
female practitioners . . .
In our efforts to make sixteenth-century Spain part of the grand narrative of medicine within the Scientific Revolution, what do we obscure
or outright sacrifice? Why have we been driven to sacrifice the discordant
voices for harmony? I would like to provide an example from my own
work of the ways in which Joan’s willingness to embrace complexity
instead of being driven by a grand narrative of progress or, at least, a
linear and forward movement can help scholars in the field give voice to
Spain’s stories without forcing those stories to fit a particular mold.
The prescriptive literature on medical regulation and education in late
sixteenth-century Spain has been somewhat disregarded by scholars, and
the legal measures Philip II enacted to protect the public health labeled
as ineffective(prescriptive in nature, ignored by practitioners, no way to
enforce, etc.). Scholars have used these sources to document moments
of patronage, medical innovation, and the introduction of new medical
techniques or knowledge to the canon. Yet if we are willing to trace the
various influences on these documents as Joan suggests, what might
they reveal to us about medical knowledge and practice from various
competing agents? If we examine these same sources from a different
perspective what complexities do these sources offer? More specifically,
how did patients’ concerns about access to qualified medical practitioners
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intersect with state and local authorities’ interests in regulation and control and practitioners’ concerns with professional identity and economic
security? All parties claimed an invested interest in protection of the
public health—overlapping jurisdictions of interest and authority—
moments of collision and collusion.
Some context: During the reign of Philip II (1556–98) the Spanish
crown had re-authorized its chief medical officer, the protomédico, to
regulate the medical profession by examining and granting licenses to
“physicians, surgeons, apothecaries” and refusing those unfit to practice
medicine. This effort brought state authorities into more direct legal
contact with a wide range of practitioners who specialized in treating
ailments like hernias, cataracts, ringworm, bone-setting, tumors, the
removal of bladder stones (urology) and midwifery. The sometimes contradictory nature of the medical legislation and the unclear jurisdictional
limits of the protomédico has raised legitimate concerns about the value
of such sources. Instead of abandoning these problematic sources, if we
follow Joan’s model and give agency and plausible explanation to those
moments of dissonance instead of disregarding them, we might see how
the very aspects that make these sources problematic for us today made
them useful to others. Their contradictory nature and unclear jurisdictional boundaries, I suggest, often worked in favor of empirics and helps
us understand under what circumstances some practitioners chose to
comply or engage these legal restrictions on their practices.
For example, the surgical empiric Pedro Camaño and physician Luis
Leyton brought numerous professional disputes before local authorities
in La Coruña without reaching resolution. Camaño eventually travelled
to Madrid and successfully sought a license to practice surgery from
Protomédico Olivares. The examination board found him sufficient in his
art and granted him a license to practice surgery “in all the kingdoms and
domains of His Majesty.” The crown warned authorities in La Coruña
to adhere to the decision of its protomédico and threatened to impose
stiff penalties if they posed any resistance which prevented Camaño from
practicing his art.1 In the case of barber-surgeons Sebastian de Luna,
Aysabel Galinda, and Pedro Peres, all three empirics were brought to
the protomédico’s attention by Tomás de Neyra. The documentation
does not confirm de Neyra’s trade, but one could easily suspect him
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of being a fellow practitioner seeking to thin out the competition.2 In
these cases, the perceived professional needs of practitioners coincided
with authorities’ efforts to regulate medicine in the name of protecting
the public health. Therefore, shared interests often provided avenues
for compliance or encouraged adherence to policies seemingly beyond
the interests or purview of competing groups.
A similar complexity emerges from the infrequent appearance of
female empirics in the licensing documentation. In 1573, María Hernández of Valladolid solicited a license and card of examination to “offer
treatment as an algebrista, bonesetter of legs and arms.” Hernández
admitted she had been practicing without a license since 1557 but felt
compelled to obtain the proper license “at the request of the patients”
whom she attended.3 A few years later, the protomédico approved a license
request from a female empiric to serve as a midwife, bonesetter,and to use
poultices and plasters and correct dislocations.4 And Beatriz de los Ríos
successfully petitioned the medical court for a license as an oculista or
specialist in eye disorders. These examples offer a number of complexities for us to consider: how often and how successful were cases such as
Pedro Camaño’s and Tomás Neyra’s which sought crown intervention to
settle professional difficulties? To what extent were practitioners compelled to comply by competitors and/or patients who demanded proof
of skill and expertise as in the case of María Hernández? Did an official
license allow these practitioners to charge more for services or lay claim
to additional skill and ability? Did female practitioners, in particular,
seek out licenses to overcome gender barriers in the marketplace? If the
licensing requirements (the formal examination) were the same for all
practitioners within a given specialization, does this mean that male
and female practitioners shared similar medical knowledge and expertise and that literate, university-educated and semiliterate, experiential
practitioners shared a common medical canon? Certainly the fragmentary remains of these professional lives suggest that the experiences of
some empirics was the product of multiple interests (including their
own) converging at a particular moment and should not be reduced to
a simplistic dichotomy of differences. Furthermore, their stories form
a cluster of related notions about the public health that are sometimes
competing and sometimes mutually reinforcing.
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Most importantly, they challenge us, as has Joan Cadden, to acknowledge the discordant voices in the harmony, to include (and not merely
explain away) the soloist amidst the chorus . . . and to listen when Elvira
de Guevara tells us that she sought a medical license because it offered
her “protection and proof of her right [to practice].”
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